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Farming several parcels of land, often under 
different tenure arrangements, is becoming an in­
creasingly common practice. When a portion of an 
operating unit is rented on a crop-share basis while 
the remainder is either owned or cash rented, a 
conflict between landlord and tenant concerning 
cropping intensity may result. The tenant may be 
motivated to grow less labor-intensive crops on the 
share-rented land than on his owned or cash- 
rented land. This is most likely to occur when the
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labor and machinery resources of the tenant are 
limited in relation to the size of the farming oper­
ation.
Conflict results from the fact that the tenant 
furnishes all the labor and machinery, but only re­
ceives a portion of the crop. The tenant’s return 
from labor and machine time on share-rented land 
is, therefore, lower than from the same use on 
owned or cash-rented land. To equalize returns 
from alternative uses for his labor and machinery, 
the tenant finds it profitable to devote more hours 
to his owned or cash-rented land than to the crop- 
share-rented land.
33
If the tenant has enough labor and machinery, 
share-rented land may be farmed to the same in­
tensity as owned land. However, when more land 
or livestock is added to the farm without a propor­
tional increase in labor and machinery, the tenant 
must reallocate the limited labor and machine time 
between crop-share-rented land and other farm 
enterprises. The tenant’s most profitable cropping 
program in such a situation often is one in which 
the crops requiring less labor and machine time are 
produced on the share-rented land.
The extent of the possible landlord-tenant con­
flict was investigated for a case farm in the central 
part of the Red River Valley (1). Linear program­
ming was used to determine the tenant’s profit- 
maximizing cropping system on owned and on 50- 
50 share-rented land. In the rental arrangement the 
landlord furnished the land and seed and paid half 
the fertilizer, spray and harvesting cost. Alternative 
methods of farm business expansion were used to 
study their effects on crop combinations and the 
landlord’s return from share-rented land. The 
initial farm organization and alternative methods of 
farm business expansion are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Tenant's profit-maximizing organization for a case 
study farm, under alternative methods of expansion, cen­
tral Red River Valley
Alternative  
Methods of 
Expansion
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Owned and Cash- 
Rented Land
Wheat after crop acre 374.0 595.3 472.7
Sunflowers acre 235.0
Alfalfa hay acre 173.3 94.7
50-50 Crop-Share
Rented Land (303 acres)
Wheat on fallow acre 151.5
Wheat after crop acre 250.2
Flax acre 177.7
Soybeans acre 52.8 125.3
Sows-2 litters- Not con­ Not con
butcher hogs sold sow sidered sidered 32.0
Return to tenant’s
resources1 dollar 28,355 35,992 42,326
Landlord’s return from
share rented land2 dollar 8,116 5,677 4,631
ten an t’s gross income minus production expenses. Fixed costs of 
depreciation, interest on assets and land costs have not been 
deducted.
landlord’s gross income minus direct production expenses.
The initial profit-maximizing situation results 
in share-rented land being farmed in nearly the 
same way as the owned and cash-rented land. When 
the tenant expands his farming operation without 
increasing the amount of labor and machinery, a 
less intensive cropping system for crop-share-rent­
ed land becomes most profitable for the tenant. If 
expansion takes place by cash renting additional 
land, the tenant’s profits are maximized by produc­
ing only flax and soybeans on the share-rented 
land. The expansion increases the tenant’s return 
by $7,637, but reduces the landlord’s return by 
$2,439. If farm business expansion is accomplished 
by both cash renting additional land and adding a 
hog enterprise, a wheat-summer fallow cropping 
system is optimum on the share-rented land. Un­
der this alternative, the tenant increases his total 
income by $13,971, but the landlord’s income is 
reduced by $3,485.
Not only does a crop-share lease as a part of 
an owned or cash-rented farm have the potential 
for landlord-tenant conflict, but it also tends to 
result in less efficient land use from the standpoint 
of society. Fewer resources tend to be devoted to 
the crop-share-rented land than would be the case 
if all the land were owner operated.
The only way in which such a conflict could be 
avoided within the context of a crop-share lease 
would be for the landlord to share the labor and 
machinery input with the tenant in the same pro­
portion as the crop is shared. Although this may 
be possible, it would complicate the rental arrange­
ment and would tend to make the landlord a part­
ner in the farming operation. Input sharing is fur­
ther complicated when the labor input consists of 
the tenant and his family. A more feasible solution 
is for the terms of the lease to specify the minimum 
acreages of certain crops that must be grown. In 
fact, such an understanding often exists even 
though it may not be written into the lease.
This article has demonstrated a potential land­
lord-tenant conflict using a case study farm in the 
Red River Valley. Tenants with one-year leases 
usually realize that they must consider the land­
lord’s income as well as their own if they are to 
assure themselves rental of the land in subsequent 
years. When longer term leases are written, it be­
comes important that some agreement on cropping 
programs be made part of the lease so as to avoid 
a conflict between landlord and tenant.
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